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2 Basic Concepts and their Interpretation⋆
H.D. Zeh (www.zeh-hd.de)
2.1 The Phenomenon of Decoherence
2.1.1 Superpositions
The superposition principle forms the most fundamental kinematical con-
cept of quantum theory. Its universality seems to have first been postulated
by Dirac as part of the definition of his “ket-vectors”, which he proposed as
a complete1 and general concept to characterize quantum states regardless
of any basis of representation. They were later recognized by von Neumann
as forming an abstract Hilbert space. The inner product (also needed to de-
fine a Hilbert space, and formally indicated by the distinction between “bra”
and “ket” vectors) is not part of the kinematics proper, but required for the
probability interpretation, which may be regarded as dynamics (as will be
discussed). The third Hilbert space axiom (closure with respect to Cauchy
series) is merely mathematically convenient, since one can never decide em-
pirically whether the number of linearly independent physical states is infinite
in reality, or just very large.
According to this kinematical superposition principle, any two physical
states, |1〉 and |2〉, whatever their meaning, can be superposed in the form
c1|1〉+c2|2〉, with complex numbers c1 and c2, to form a new physical state (to
be be distinguished from a state of information). By induction, the principle
can be applied to more than two, and even an infinite number, of states, and
appropriately generalized to apply to a continuum of states. After postulat-
ing the linear Schro¨dinger equation in a general form, one may furthermore
⋆ Chapter 2 of D. Giulini, E. Joos, C. Kiefer, J. Kupsch, I.-O. Stamatescu, and
H. D. Zeh: Decoherence and the Appearance of a Classical World in Quantum
Theory, 2nd edn. (Springer-Verlag, 2003). In this draft version, references to other
chapters refer to the first edition (Springer, 1996).
1 This conceptual completeness does not, of course, imply that all degrees of free-
dom of a considered system are always known and taken into account. It only
means that, within quantum theory (which, in its way, is able to describe all
known experiments), no more complete description of the system is required or
indicated. Quantum mechanics lets us even understand why we may neglect cer-
tain degrees of freedom, since gaps in the energy spectrum often “freeze them
out”.
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conclude that the superposition of two (or more) of its solutions forms again
a solution. This is the dynamical version of the superposition principle.
Let me emphasize that this superposition pinciple is in drastic contrast
to the concept of the “quantum” that gave the theory its name. Superposi-
tions obeying the Schro¨dinger equation describe a deterministically evolving
continuum rather than discrete quanta and stochastic quantum jumps. Ac-
cording to the theory of decoherence, these effective concepts “emerge” as a
consequence of the superposition principle when universally and consistently
applied.
A dynamical superposition principle (though in general with respect to
real numbers only) is also known from classical waves which obey a linear
wave equation. Its validity is then restricted to cases where these equations
apply, while the quantum superposition principle is meant to be universal and
exact. However, while the physical meaning of classical superpositions is usu-
ally obvious, that of quantum mechanical superpositions has to be somehow
determined. For example, the interpretation of a superposition
∫
dq eipq |q〉 as
representing a state of momentum p can be derived from “quantization rules”,
valid for systems whose classical counterparts are known in their Hamiltonian
form (see Sect. 2.2). In other cases, an interpretation may be derived from
the dynamics or has to be based on experiments.
Dirac emphasized another (in his opinion even more important) differ-
ence: all non-vanishing components of (or projections from) a superposition
are “in some sense contained” in it. This formulation seems to refer to an en-
semble of physical states, which would imply that their description by formal
“quantum states” is not complete. Another interpretation asserts that it is
the (Schro¨dinger) dynamics rather than the concept of quantum states which
is incomplete. States found in measurements would then have to arise from an
initial state by means of an indeterministic “collapse of the wave function”.
Both interpretations meet serious difficulties when consistently applied (see
Sect. 2.3).
In the third edition of his textbook, Dirac (1947) starts to explain the su-
perposition principle by discussing one-particle states, which can be described
by Schro¨dinger waves in three-dimensional space. This is an important appli-
cation, although its similarity with classical waves may also be misleading.
Wave functions derived from the quantization rules are defined on their clas-
sical configuration space, which happens to coincide with normal space only
for a single mass point. Except for this limitation, the two-slit interference
experiment, for example, (effectively a two-state superposition) is known to
be very instructive. Dirac’s second example, the superposition of two basic
photon polarizations, no longer corresponds to a spatial wave. These two
basic states “contain” all possible photon polarizations. The electron spin,
another two-state system, exhausts the group SU(2) by a two-valued repre-
sentation of spatial rotations, and it can be studied (with atoms or neutrons)
by means of many variations of the Stern–Gerlach experiment. In his lecture
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notes (Feynman, Leighton, and Sands 1965), Feynman describes the maser
mode of the ammonia molecule as another (very different) two-state system.
All these examples make essential use of superpositions of the kind |α〉 =
c1 |1〉+ c2 |2〉, where the states |1〉, |2〉, and (all) |α〉 can be observed as phys-
ically different states, and distinguished from one another in an appropriate
setting. In the two-slit experiment, the states |1〉 and |2〉 represent the par-
tial Schro¨dinger waves that pass through one or the other slit. Schro¨dinger’s
wave function can itself be understood as a consequence of the superposi-
tion principle by being viewed as the amplitudes ψα(q) in the superposition
of “classical” configurations q (now represented by corresponding quantum
states |q〉 or their narrow wave packets). In this case of a system with a known
classical counterpart, the superpositions |α〉 = ∫ dq ψα(q)|q〉 are assumed to
define all quantum states. They may represent new observable properties
(such as energy or angular momentum), which are not simply functions of
the configuration, f(q), only as a nonlocal whole, but not as an integral over
corresponding local densities (neither on space nor on configuration space).
Since Schro¨dinger’s wave function is thus defined on (in general high-
dimensional) configuration space, increasing its amplitude does not describe
an increase of intensity or energy density, as it would for classical waves
in three-dimensional space. Superpositions of the intuitive product states of
composite quantum systems may not only describe particle exchange sym-
metries (for bosons and fermions); in the general case they lead to the fun-
damental concept of quantum nonlocality. The latter has to be distinguished
from a mere extension in space (characterizing extended classical objects). For
example, molecules in energy eigenstates are incompatible with their atoms
being in definite quantum states themselves. Although the importance of this
“entanglement” for many observable quantities (such as the binding energy
of the helium atom, or total angular momentum) had been well known, its
consequence of violating Bell’s inequalities (Bell 1964) seems to have sur-
prised many physicists, since this result strictly excluded all local theories
conceivably underlying quantum theory. However, quantum nonlocality ap-
pears paradoxical only when one attempts to interpret the wave function
in terms of an ensemble of local properties, such as “particles”. If reality
were defined to be local (“in space and time”), then it would indeed conflict
with the empirical actuality of a general superposition. Within the quantum
formalism, entanglement also leads to decoherence, and in this way it ex-
plains the classical appearance of the observed world in quantum mechanical
terms. The application of this program is the main subject of this book (see
also Zurek 1991, Mensky 2000, Tegmark and Wheeler 2001, Zurek 2001, or
www.decoherence.de).
The predictive power of the superposition principle became particularly
evident when it was applied in an ingenious step to postulate the existence
of superpositions of states with different particle numbers (Jordan and Klein
1927). Their meaning is illustrated, for example, by “coherent states” of dif-
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ferent photon numbers, which may represent quasi-classical states of the elec-
tromagnetic field (cf. Glauber 1963). Such dynamically arising (and in many
cases experimentally confirmed) superpositions are often misinterpreted as
representing “virtual” states, or mere probability amplitudes for the occur-
rence of “real” states that are assumed to possess definite particle number.
This would be as mistaken as replacing a hydrogen wave function by the
probability distribution p(r) = |ψ(r)|2, or an entangled state by an ensem-
ble of product states (or a two-point function). A superposition is in general
observably different from an ensemble consisting of its components with cor-
responding probabilities.
Another spectacular success of the superposition principle was the pre-
diction of new particles formed as superpositions of K-mesons and their an-
tiparticles (Gell-Mann and Pais 1955, Lee and Yang 1956). A similar model
describes the recently confirmed “neutrino oscillations” (Wolfenstein 1978),
which are superpositions of energy eigenstates.
The superposition principle can also be successfully applied to states that
may be generated by means of symmetry transformations from asymmet-
ric ones. In classical mechanics, a symmetric Hamiltonian means that each
asymmetric solution (such as an elliptical Kepler orbit) implies other solu-
tions, obtained by applying the symmetry transformations (e.g. rotations).
Quantum theory requires in addition that all their superpositions also form
solutions (cf. Wigner 1964, or Gross 1995; see also Sect. 9.6). A complete set
of energy eigenstates can then be constructed by means of irreducible linear
representations of the dynamical symmetry group. Among them are usually
symmetric ones (such as s-waves for scalar particles) that need not have a
counterpart in classical mechanics.
A great number of novel applications of the superpositon principle have
been studied experimentally or theoretically during recent years. For exam-
ple, superpositions of different “classical” states of laser modes (“mesoscopic
Schro¨dinger cats”) have been prepared (Monroe et al. 1996), the entangle-
ment of photon pairs has been confirmed to persist over tens of kilometers
(Tittel et al. 1998), and interference experiments with fullerene molecules
were successfully performed (Arndt et al. 1999). Even superpositions of a
macroscopic current running in opposite directions have been shown to ex-
ist, and confirmed to be different from a state with two (cancelling) currents
(Mooij et al. 1999, Friedman et al. 2000). Quantum computers, now under
intense investigation, would have to perform “parallel” (but not spatially sep-
arated) calculations, while forming one superposition that may later have a
coherent effect. So-called quantum teleportation requires the advanced prepa-
ration of an entangled state of distant systems (cf. Busch et al. 2001 for a
consistent description in quantum mechanical terms). One of its components
may then later be selected by a local measurement in order to determine the
state of the other (distant) system.
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Whenever an experiment was technically feasible, all components of a
superposition have been shown to act coherently, thus proving that they
exist simultaneously. It is surprising that many physicists still seem to regard
superpositions as representing some state of ignorance (merely characterizing
unpredictable “events”). After the fullerene experiments there remains but
a minor step to discuss conceivable (though hardly realizable) interference
experiments with a conscious observer. Would he have one or many “minds”
(when being aware of his path through the slits)?
The most general quantum states seem to be superpositions of differ-
ent classical fields on three- or higher-dimensional space.2 In a perturbation
expansion in terms of free “particles” (wave modes) this leads to terms cor-
responding to Feynman diagrams, as shown long ago by Dyson (1949). The
path integral describes a superposition of paths, that is, the propagation of
wave functionals according to a generalized Schro¨dinger equation, while the
individual paths under the integral have no physical meaning by themselves.
(A similar method could be used to describe the propagation of classical
waves.) Wave functions will here always be understood in the generalized
sense of wave functionals if required.
One has to keep in mind this universality of the superposition princi-
ple and its consequences for individually observable physical properties in
order to appreciate the meaning of the program of decoherence. Since quan-
tum coherence is far more than the appearance of spatial interference fringes
observed statistically in series of “events”, decoherence must not simply be
understood in a classical sense as their washing out under fluctuating envi-
ronmental conditions.
2.1.2 Superselection Rules
In spite of this success of the superposition principle it soon became evi-
dent that not all conceivable superpositions are found in Nature. This led
some physicists to postulate “superselection rules”, which restrict this prin-
ciple by axiomatically excluding certain superpositions (Wick, Wightman,
2 The empirically correct “pre-quantum” configurations for fermions are given by
spinor fields on space, while the apparently observed particles are no more than
the consequence of decoherence by means of local interactions with the environ-
ment (see Chap. 3). Field amplitudes (such as ψ(r)) seem to form the general
arguments of the wave function(al) Ψ , while space points r appear as their “in-
dices” – not as dynamical position variables. Neither a “second quantization” nor
a wave-particle dualism are required. N-particle wave functions may be obtained
as a non-relativistic approximation by applying the superposition principle (as
a “quantization procedure”) to these apparent particles instead of the correct
pre-quantum variables (fields), which are not directly observable for fermions.
The concept of particle permutations then becomes a redundancy (see Sect. 9.6).
Unified field theories are usually expected to provide a general (supersymmetric)
pre-quantum field and its Hamiltonian.
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and Wigner 1970, Streater and Wightman 1964). There are also attempts to
derive some of these superselection rules from other principles, which can be
postulated in quantum field theory (see Chaps. 6 and 7). In general, these
principles merely exclude “unwanted” consequences of a general superposi-
tion principle by hand.
Most disturbing in this sense seem to be superpositions of states with
integer and half-integer spin (bosons and fermions). They violate invariance
under 2pi-rotations (see Sect. 6.2), but such a non-invariance has been exper-
imentally confirmed in a different way (Rauch et al. 1975). The theory of
supersymmetry (Wess and Zumino 1971) postulates superpositions of bosons
and fermions. Another supposedly “fundamental” superselection rule forbids
superpositions of different charge. For example, superpositions of a proton
and a neutron have never been directly observed, although they occur in
the isotopic spin formalism. This (dynamically broken) symmetry was later
successfully generalized to SU(3) and other groups in order to characterize
further intrinsic degrees of freedom. However, superpositions of a proton and
a neutron may “exist” within nuclei, where isospin-dependent self-consistent
potentials may arise from an intrinsic symmetry breaking. Similarly, superpo-
sitions of different charge are used to form BCS states (Bardeen, Cooper, and
Schrieffer 1957), which describe the intrinsic properties of superconductors.
In these cases, definite charge values have to be projected out (see Sect. 9.6)
in order to describe the observed physical objects, which do obey the charge
superselection rule.
Other limitations of the superposition principle are less clearly defined.
While elementary particles are described by means of wave functions (that
is, superpositions of different positions or other properties), the moon seems
always to be at a definite place, and a cat is either dead or alive. A general
superposition principle would even allow superpositions of a cat and a dog (as
suggested by Joos). They would have to define a ”new animal” – analogous
to a Klong, which is a superposition of a K-meson and its antiparticle. In the
Copenhagen interpretation, this difference is attributed to a strict conceptual
separation between the microscopic and the macroscopic world. However,
where is the border line that distinguishes an n-particle state of quantum
mechanics from an N-particle state that is classical? Where, precisely, does
the superposition principle break down?
Chemists do indeed know that a border line seems to exist deep in the
microscopic world (Primas 1981, Woolley 1986). For example, most molecules
(save the smallest ones) are found with their nuclei in definite (usually ro-
tating and/or vibrating) classical “configurations”, but hardly ever in super-
positions thereof, as it would be required for energy or angular momentum
eigenstates. The latter are observed for hydrogen and other small molecules.
Even chiral states of a sugar molecule appear “classical”, in contrast to its
parity and energy eigenstates, which correctly describe the otherwise analo-
gous maser mode states of the ammonia molecule (see Sect. 3.2.4 for details).
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Does this difference mean that quantum mechanics breaks down already for
very small particle number?
Certainly not in general, since there are well established superpositions
of many-particle states: phonons in solids, superfluids, SQUIDs, white dwarf
stars and many more! All properties of macroscopic bodies which can be cal-
culated quantitatively are consistent with quantum mechanics, but not with
any microscopic classical description. As will be demonstrated throughout
the book, the theory of decoherence is able to explain the apparent differ-
ences between the quantum and the classical world under the assumption of
a universally valid quantum theory.
The attempt to derive the absence of certain superpositions from (exact or
approximate) conservation laws, which forbid or suppress transitions between
their corresponding components, would be insufficient. This “traditional” ex-
planation (which seems to be the origin of the name “superselection rule”)
was used, for example, by Hund (1927) in his arguments in favor of the chiral
states of molecules. However, small or vanishing transition rates require in
addition that superpositions were absent initially for all these molecules (or
their constituents from which they formed). Similarly, charge conservation
does not explain the charge superselection rule! Negligible wave packet dis-
persion (valid for large mass) may prevent initially presumed wave packets
from growing wider, but this initial condition is quantitatively insufficient to
explain the quasi-classical appearance of mesoscopic objects, such as small
dust grains or large molecules (see Sect. 3.2.1), or even that of celestial bodies
in chaotic motion (Zurek and Paz 1994). Even initial conditions for conserved
quantities would in general allow one only to exclude global superpositions,
but not local ones (Giulini, Kiefer and Zeh 1995).
So how can superselection rules be explained within quantum theory?
2.1.3 Decoherence by “Measurements”
Other experiments with quantum objects have taught us that interference, for
example between partial waves, disappears when the property characterizing
these partial waves is measured. Such partial waves may describe the passage
through different slits of an interference device, or the two beams of a Stern–
Gerlach device (“Welcher Weg experiments”). This loss of coherence is indeed
required by mere logic once measurements are assumed to lead to definite re-
sults. In this case, the frequencies of events on the detection screen measured
in coincidence with a certain passage can be counted separately, and thus
have to be added to define the total probabilities.3 It is therefore a plausible
3 Mere logic does not require, however, that the frequencies of events on the screen
which follow the observed passage through slit 1 of a two-slit experiment, say, are
the same as those without measurement, but with slit 2 closed. This distinction
would be relevant in Bohm’s theory (Bohm 1952) if it allowed nondisturbing mea-
surements of the (now assumed) passage through one definite slit (as it does not in
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experience that the interference disappears also when the passage is “mea-
sured” without registration of a definite result. The latter may be assumed to
have become a “classical fact” as soon the measurement has irreversibly “oc-
curred”. A quantum phenomenon may thus “become a phenomenon” without
being observed (in contrast to this early formulation of Bohr’s, which is in
accordance with Heisenberg’s idealistic statement about a trajectory coming
into being by its observation – while Bohr later spoke of objective irreversible
events occurring in the counter). However, what presicely is an irreversible
quantum event? According to Bohr, it can not be dynamically analyzed.
Analysis within the quantummechanical formalism demonstrates nonethe-
less that the essential condition for this “decoherence” is that complete infor-
mation about the passage is carried away in some physical form (Zeh 1970,
1973, Mensky 1979, Zurek 1981, Caldeira and Leggett 1983, Joos and Zeh
1985). Possessing “information” here means that the physical state of the
environment is now uniquely quantum correlated (entangled) with the rele-
vant property of the system (such as a passage through a specific slit). This
need not happen in a controllable form (as in a measurement): the “informa-
tion” may as well be created in the form of noise. However, in contrast to
statistical correlations, quantum correlations define pure (completly defined)
nonlocal states, and thus individual physical properties, such as the total spin
of spatially separated objects. Therefore, one cannot explain entanglement in
terms of the concept of information (cf. Brukner and Zeilinger 2000). This
terminology would mislead to the popular misunderstanding of the collapse
as a “mere increase of information” (which would require an initial ensem-
ble describing ignorance). Since environmental decoherence affects individual
physical states, it can neither be the consequence of phase averaging in an
ensemble, nor one of phases fluctuating uncontrollably in time (as claimed
in some textbooks). For example, nonlocal entanglement exists in the static
quantum state of a relativstic physical vacuum (even though it is then often
visualized in terms of particles as “vacuum fluctuations”).
When is unambiguous “information” carried away? If a macroscopic ob-
ject had the opportunity of passing through two slits, we would always be
able to convince ourselves of its choice of a path by simply opening our eyes
in order to “look”. This means that in this case there is plenty of light that
contains information about the path (even in a controllable manner that al-
lows “looking”). Interference between different paths never occurs, since the
order to remain indistinguishable from quantum theory). The fact that these two
quite different situations (closing slit 2 or measuring the passage through slit 1)
lead to exactly the same subsequent frequencies, which differ entirely from those
that are defined by this theory when not measured or selected, emphasizes its
extremely artificial nature (see also Englert et al. 1992, or Zeh 1999). The predic-
tions of quantum theory are here simply reproduced by leaving the Schro¨dinger
equation unaffected and universally valid, identical with Everett’s assumptions
(Everett 1957). In both these theories the wave function is (for good reasons)
regarded as a real physical object (cf. Bell 1981).
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path is evidently “continuously measured” by light. The common textbook
argument that the interference pattern of macroscopic objects be too fine to
be observable is entirely irrelevant. However, would it then not be sufficient
to dim the light in order to reproduce (in principle) a quantum mechanical
interference pattern for macroscopic objects?
This could be investigated by means of more sophisticated experiments
with mesoscopic objects (see Brune et al. 1996). However, in order to precisely
determine the subtle limit where measurement by the environment becomes
negligible, it is more economic first to apply the established theory which is
known to describe such experiments. Thereby we have to take into account
the quantum nature of the environment, as discussed long ago by Brillouin
(1962) for an information medium in general. This can usually be done easily,
since the quantum theory of interacting systems, such as the quantum the-
ory of particle scattering, is well understood. Its application to decoherence
requires that one averages over all unobserved degrees of freedom. In tech-
nical terms, one has to “trace out the environment” after it has interacted
with the considered system. This procedure leads to a quantitative theory of
decoherence (cf. Joos and Zeh 1985). Taking the trace is based on the prob-
ability interpretation applied to the environment (averaging over all possible
outcomes of measurements), even though this environment is not measured.
(The precise physical meaning of these formal concepts will be discussed in
Sect. 2.4.)
Is it possible to explain all superselection rules in this way as an effect
induced by the environment4 – including the existence and position of the
border line between microscopic and macroscopic behaviour in the realm
of molecules? This would mean that the universality of the superposition
principle could be maintained – as is indeed the basic idea of the program of
decoherence (Zeh 1970, Zurek 1982; see also Chap. 4 of Zeh 2001). If physical
states are thus exclusively described by wave functions rather than by points
in configuration space – as originally intended by Schro¨dinger in space by
means of narrow wave packets instead of particles – then no uncertainty
relations are available for states in order to explain the probabilistic aspects
of quantum theory: the Fourier theorem applies to a given wave function(al).
As another example, consider two states of different charge. They inter-
act very differently with the electromagnetic field even in the absence of
radiation: their Coulomb fields carry complete “information” about the total
charge at any distance. The quantum state of this field would thus decohere
a superposition of different charges if considered as a quantum system in a
bounded region of space (Giulini, Kiefer, and Zeh 1995). This instantaneous
action of decoherence at an arbitrary distance by means of the Coulomb field
gives it the appearance of a kinematical effect, although it is based on the
4 It would be sufficient, for this purpose, to use an internal “environment” (un-
observed degrees of freedom), but the assumption of a closed system would in
general be unrealistic.
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dynamical law of charge conservation, compatible with a retarded field that
would “measure” the charge (see Sect. 6.4).
There are many other cases where the unavoidable effect of decoherence
can easily be imagined without any calculation. For example, superpositions
of macroscopically different electromagnetic fields, f(r), may be described
by a field functional Ψ [f(r)]. However, any charged particle in a sufficiently
narrow wave packet would then evolve into different packets, depending on
the field f , and thus become entangled with the state of the quantum field
(Ku¨bler and Zeh 1973, Kiefer 1992, Zurek, Habib, and Paz 1993; see also
Sect. 4.1.2). The particle can be said to “measure” the quantum state of the
field. Since charged particles are in general abundant in the environment, no
superpositions of macroscopically different electromagnetic fields (or different
“mean fields” in other cases) are observed under normal conditions. This
result is related to the difficulty of preparing and maintaining “squeezed
states” of light (Yuen 1976) – see Sect. 3.3.3.1. Therefore, the field appears
to be in one of its classical states (Sect. 4.1.2).
In all these cases, this conclusion requires that the quasi-classical states
(or “pointer states” in measurements) are robust (dynamically stable) under
natural decoherence, as pointed out already in the first paper on decoherence
(Zeh 1970; see also Dio´si and Kiefer 2000).
A particularly important example of a quasiclassical field is the metric
of general relativity (with classical states described by spatial geometries on
space-like hypersurfaces – see Sect. 4.2). Decoherence caused by all kinds
of matter can therefore explain the absence of superpositions of macroscop-
ically distinct spatial curvatures (Joos 1986, Zeh 1986, 1988, Kiefer 1987),
while microscopic superpositions would describe those hardly ever observ-
able gravitons.
Superselection rules thus arise as a straightforward consequence of quan-
tum theory under realistic assumptions. They have nonetheless been dis-
cussed mainly in mathematical physics – apparently under the influence of
von Neumann’s and Wigner’s “orthodox” interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics (see Wightman 1995 for a review). Decoherence by “continuous measure-
ment” seems to form the most fundamental irreversible process in Nature. It
applies even where thermodynamical concepts do not (such as for individual
molecules – see Sect. 3.2.4), or when any exchange of heat is entirely negligi-
ble. Its time arrow of “microscopic causality” requires a Sommerfeld radiation
condition for microscopic scattering (similar to Boltzmann’s chaos), viz., the
absence of any dynamically relevant initial correlations, which would define
a “conspiracy” in common terminology (Joos and Zeh 1985, Zeh 2001).
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2.2 Observables as a Derived Concept
Measurements are usually described by means of “observables”, formally rep-
resented by Hermitian operators, and introduced in addition to the concepts
of quantum states and their dynamics as a fundamental and independent
ingredient of quantum theory. However, even though often forming the start-
ing point of a formal quantization procedure, this ingredient should not be
separately required if physical states are well described by these formal quan-
tum states. This understanding, to be further explained below, complies with
John Bell’s quest for the replacement of observables with “beables” (see Bell
1987). It was for this reason that his preference shifted from Bohm’s theory
to collapse models (where wave functions are assumed to completely describe
reality) during his last years.
Let |α〉 be an arbitrary quantum state, defined operationally (up to a
complex numerical factor) by a “complete preparation” procedure. The phe-
nomenological probability for finding the system during an appropriate mea-
surement in another quantum state |n〉, say, is given by means of their inner
product as pn = |〈n | α〉|2 (where both states are assumed to be normalized).
The state |n〉 is here defined by the specific measurement. (In a position mea-
surement, for example, the number n has to be replaced with the continuous
coordinates x, y, z, leading to the “improper” Hilbert states |r〉.) For measure-
ments of the “first kind” (to which all others can be approximately reduced
– see Sect. 2.3), the system will again be found in the state |n〉 with certainty
if the measurement is immediately repeated. Preparations can be regarded as
such measurements which select a certain subset of outcomes for further mea-
surements. n-preparations are therefore also called n-filters, since all “not-n”
results are thereby excluded from the subsequent experiment proper. The
above probabilities can also be written in the form pn = 〈α | Pn | α〉, with
an “observable” Pn := |n〉〈n|, which is thus derived from the kinematical
concept of quantum states.
Instead of these special “n or not-n measurements” (with fixed n), one
can also perform more general “n1 or n2 or . . . measurements”, with all ni’s
mutually exclusive (〈ni|nj〉 = δij). If the states forming such a set {|n〉} are
pure and exhaustive (that is, complete,
∑
Pn = 1l), they represent a basis of
the corresponding Hilbert space. By introducing an arbitrary “measurement
scale” an, one may construct general observables A =
∑ |n〉an〈n|, which
permit the definition of “expectation values” 〈α | A | α〉 = ∑ pnan. In the
special case of a yes-no measurement, one has an = δnn0 , and expectation
values become probabilities. Finding the state |n〉 during a measurement is
then also expressed as “finding the value an of an observable”. A change
of scale, bn = f(an), describes the same physical measurement; for position
measurements of a particle it would simply represent a coordinate transfor-
mation. Even a measurement of the particle’s potential energy is equivalent
to a position measurement (up to degeneracy) if the function V (r) is given.
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According to this definition, quantum expectation values must not be
understood as mean values in an ensemble that represents ignorance of the
precise state. Rather, they have to be interpreted as probabilities for poten-
tially arising quantum states |n〉 – regardless of the latters’ interpretation.
If the set {|n〉} of such potential states forms a basis, any state |α〉 can be
represented as a superposition |α〉 =∑ cn|n〉. In general, it neither forms an
n0-state nor any not-n0 state. Its dependence on the complex coefficients cn
requires that states which differ from one another by a numerical factor must
be different “in reality”. This is true even though they represent the same
“ray” in Hilbert space and cannot, according to the measurement postulate,
be distinguished operationally. The states |n1〉+|n2〉 and |n1〉−|n2〉 could not
be physically different from another if |n2〉 and −|n2〉 were the same state.
(Only a global numerical factor would be “redundant”.) For this reason, pro-
jection operators |n〉〈n| are insufficient to characterize quantum states (cf.
also Mirman 1970).
The expansion coefficients cn, relating physically meaningful states – for
example those describing different spin directions or different versions of the
K-meson – must in principle be determined (relative to one another) by ap-
propriate experiments. However, they can often be derived from a previously
known (or conjectured) classical theory by means of “quantization rules”.
In this case, the classical configurations q (such as particle positions or field
variables) are postulated to parametrize a basis in Hilbert space, {|q〉}, while
the canonical momenta p parametrize another one, {|p〉}. Their correspond-
ing observables, Q =
∫
dq |q〉q〈q| and P = ∫ dp |p〉p〈p|, are required to obey
commutation relations in analogy to the classical Poisson brackets. In this
way, they form an important tool for constructing and interpreting the spe-
cific Hilbert space of quantum states. These commutators essentially deter-
mine the unitary transformation 〈p | q〉 (e.g. as a Fourier transform eipq) –
thus more than what could be defined by means of the projection operators
|q〉〈q| and |p〉〈p|. This algebraic procedure is mathematically very elegant
and appealing, since the Poisson brackets and commutators may represent
generalized symmetry transformations. However, the concept of observables
(which form the algebra) can be derived from the more fundamental one of
state vectors and their inner products, as described above.
Physical states are assumed to vary in time in accordance with a dynam-
ical law – in quantum mechanics of the form i∂t|α〉 = H |α〉. In contrast,
a measurement device is usually defined regardless of time. This must then
also hold for the observable representing it, or for its eigenbasis {|n〉}. The
probabilities pn(t) = |〈n | α(t)〉|2 will therefore vary with time according to
the time-dependence of the physical states |α〉. It is well known that this
(Schro¨dinger) time dependence is formally equivalent to the (inverse) time
dependence of observables (or the reference states |n〉). Since observables
“correspond” to classical variables, this time dependence appeared sugges-
tive in the Heisenberg–Born–Jordan algebraic approach to quantum theory.
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However, the absence of dynamical states |α(t)〉 from this Heisenberg picture,
a consequence of insisting on classical kinematical concepts, leads to para-
doxes and conceptual inconsistencies (complementarity, dualism, quantum
logic, quantum information, and all that).
An environment-induced superselection rule means that certain superpo-
sitions are highly unstable with respect to decoherence. It is then impossible
in practice to construct measurement devices for them. This empirical situa-
tion has led some physicists to deny the existence of these superpositions and
their corresponding observables – either by postulate or by formal manipu-
lations of dubious interpretation, often including infinities. In an attempt to
circumvent the measurement problem (that will be discussed in the follow-
ing section), they often simply regard such superpositions as “mixtures” once
they have formed according to the Schro¨dinger equation (cf. Primas 1990).
While any basis {|n〉} in Hilbert space defines formal probabilities, pn =
|〈n|α〉|2, only a basis consisting of states that are not immediately destroyed
by decoherence defines a practically “realizable observable”. Since realizable
observables usually form a genuine subset of all formal observables (diagonal-
izable operators), they must contain a nontrivial “center” in algebraic terms.
It consists of those of them which commute with all the rest. Observables
forming the center may be regarded as “classical”, since they can be mea-
sured simultaneously with all realizable ones. In the algebraic approach to
quantum theory, this center appears as part of its axiomatic structure (Jauch
1968). However, since the condition of decoherence has to be considered quan-
titatively (and may even vary to some extent with the specific nature of the
environment), this algebraic classification remains an approximate and dy-
namically emerging scheme.
These “classical” observables thus define the subspaces into which super-
positions decohere. Hence, even if the superposition of a right-handed and a
left-handed chiral molecule, say, could be prepared by means of an appropri-
ate (very fast) measurement of the first kind, it would be destroyed before
the measurement may be repeated for a test. In contrast, the chiral states
of all individual molecules in a bag of sugar are “robust” in a normal envi-
ronment, and thus retain this property individually over time intervals which
by far exceed thermal relaxation times. This stability may even be increased
by the quantum Zeno effect (Sect. 3.3.1). Therefore, chirality appears not
only classical, but also as an approximate constant of the motion that has to
be taken into account in the definition of thermodynamical ensembles (see
Sect. 2.3).
The above-used description of measurements of the first kind by means
of probabilities for transitions |α〉 → |n〉 (or, for that matter, by correspond-
ing observables) is phenomenological. However, measurements should be de-
scribed dynamically as interactions between the measured system and the
measurement device. The observable (that is, the measurement basis) should
thus be derived from the corresponding interaction Hamiltonian and the ini-
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tial state of the device. As discussed by von Neumann (1932), this interaction
must be diagonal with respect to the measurement basis (see also Zurek 1981).
Its diagonal matrix elements are operators which act on the quantum state of
the device in such a way that the “pointer” moves into a position appropriate
for being read, |n〉|Φ0〉 → |n〉|Φn〉. Here, the first ket refers to the system,
the second one to the device. The states |Φn〉, representing different pointer
positions, must approximately be mutually orthogonal, and “classical” in the
explained sense.
Because of the dynamical superposition principle, an initial superposition∑
cn|n〉 does not lead to definite pointer positions (with their empirically ob-
served frequencies). If decoherence is neglected, one obtains their entangled
superposition
∑
cn|n〉|Φn〉, that is, a state that is different from all poten-
tial measurement outcomes |n〉|Φn〉. This dilemma represents the “quantum
measurement problem” to be discussed in Sect. 2.3. Von Neumann’s inter-
action is nonetheless regarded as the first step of a measurement (a “pre-
measurement”). Yet, a collapse seems still to be required – now in the mea-
surement device rather than in the microscopic system. Because of the en-
tanglement between system and apparatus, it then affects the total system.5
If, in a certain measurement, a whole subset of states |n〉 leads to the
same pointer position |Φn0〉, these states are not distinguished in this mea-
surement. The pointer state |Φn0〉 now becomes dynamically correlated with
the whole projection of the initial state,
∑
cn|n〉, on the subspace spanned by
this subset. A corresponding collapse was indeed postulated by Lu¨ders (1951)
in his generalization of von Neumann’s “first intervention” (Sect. 2.3).
In this dynamical sense, the interaction with an appropriate measuring
device defines an observable up to arbitrary monotoneous scale transforma-
tions. The time dependence of observables according to the Heisenberg pic-
ture would thus describe an imaginary time dependence of the states of this
device (its pointer states), paradoxically controlled by the intrinsic Hamilto-
nian of the system.
The question of whether a formal observable (that is, a diagonalizable
operator) can be physically realized can only be answered by taking into ac-
count the unavoidable environment of the system (while the measurement
device is always asssumed to decohere into its macroscopic pointer states).
However, environment-induced decoherence by itself does not solve the mea-
surement problem, since the “pointer states” |Φn〉 may be assumed to include
the total environment (the “rest of the world”). Identifying the thus arising
5 Some authors seem to have taken the phenomenological collapse in the micro-
scopic system by itself too literally, and therefore disregarded the state of the
measurement device in their measurement theory (see Machida and Namiki 1980,
Srinivas 1984, and Sect. 9.1). Their approach is based on the assumption that
quantum states must always exist for all systems. This would be in conflict with
quantum nonlocality, even though it may be in accordance with early interpre-
tations of the quantum formalism.
2 Basic Concepts and their Interpretation 15
global superposition with an ensemble of states, represented by a statistical
operator ρ, that merely leads to the same expectation values 〈A〉 = tr(Aρ)
for a limited set of observables {A} would obviously beg the question. This
argument is nonetheless found wide-spread in the literature (cf. Haag 1992,
who used the subset of all local observables).
In Sect. 2.4, statistical operators ρ will be derived from the concept of
quantum states as a tool for calculating expectation values, while the latter
are defined, as described above, by means of probabilities for the occurrence
of new states in measurements. In the Heisenberg picture, ρ is often regarded
as in some sense representing the ensemble of potential “values” for all ob-
servables that are here postulated to formally replace the classical variables.
This interpretation is suggestive because of the (incomplete) formal analogy
of ρ to a classical phase space distribution. However, the prospective “values”
would be physically meaningful only if they characterized different physical
states (such as pointer states). Note that Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations
refer to potential outcomes which may arise in different (mutually exclusive)
measurements.
2.3 The Measurement Problem
The superposition of different measurement outcomes, resulting according to
the Schro¨dinger equation (as discussed above), demonstrates that a “naive
ensemble interpretation” of quantummechanics in terms of incomplete knowl-
edge is ruled out. It would mean that a quantum state (such as
∑
cn|n〉|Φn〉)
represents an ensemble of some as yet unspecified fundamental states, of
which a subensemble (for example represented by the quantum state |n〉|Φn〉)
may be “picked out by a mere increase of information”. If this were true, then
the subensemble resulting from this measurement could in principle be traced
back in time by means of the Schro¨dinger equation in order to determine also
the initial state more completely (to “postselect” it – see Aharonov and Vaid-
man 1991 for an inappropriate attempt). In the above case this would lead to
the initial quantum state |n〉|Φ0〉 that is physically different from – and thus
inconsistent with – the superposition (
∑
cn|n〉)|Φ0〉 that had been prepared
(whatever it means).
In spite of this simple argument, which demonstrates that an ensemble
interpretation would require a complicated and miraculous nonlocal “back-
ground mechanism” in order to work consistently (cf. Footnote 3 regarding
Bohm’s theory), the ensemble interpretation of the wave function seems to
remain the most popular one because of its pragmatic (though limited) value.
A general and rigorous critical discussion of problems arising in an ensemble
interpretation may be found in d’Espagnat’s books (1976 and 1995).
A way out of this dilemma in terms of the wave function itself requires
one of the following two possibilities: (1) a modification of the Schro¨dinger
equation that explicitly describes a collapse (also called “spontaneous local-
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ization” – see Chap. 8), or (2) an Everett type interpretation, in which all
measurement outcomes are assumed to coexist in one formal superposition,
but to be perceived separately as a consequence of their dynamical decoupling
under decoherence. While this latter suggestion may appear “extravagant”
(as it requires myriads of coexisting parallel quasi-classical “worlds”), it is
similar in principle to the conventional (though nontrivial) assumption, made
tacitly in all classical descriptions of observations, that consciousness is local-
ized in certain (semi-stable and suffiently complex) spatial subsystems of the
world (such as human brains or parts thereof). For a dispute about which of
the above-mentioned two possibilities should be preferred, the fact that en-
vironmental decoherence readily describes precisely the apparently occurring
“quantum jumps” or “collapse events” (as will be discussed in great detail
throughout this book) appears most essential.
The dynamical rules which are (explicitly or tacitly) used to describe the
effective time dependence of quantum states thus represent a “dynamical
dualism”. This was first clearly formulated by von Neumann (1932), who
distinguished between the unitary evolution according to the Schro¨dinger
equation (remarkably his “zweiter Eingriff” or “second intervention”),
ih¯
∂
∂t
|ψ〉 = H |ψ〉 , (2.1)
valid for isolated (absolutely closed) systems, and the “reduction” or “collapse
of the wave function”,
|ψ〉 =
∑
cn|n〉 → |n0〉 (2.2)
(remarkably his “first intervention”). The latter was to describe the stochas-
tic transitions into the new state |n0〉 during measurements. Their dynamical
discontinuity had been anticipated by Bohr in the form of “quantum jumps”
between his discrete electron orbits. Later, the time-dependent Schro¨dinger
equation (2.1) for interacting systems was often regarded merely as a method
of calculating probabilities for similar (individually unpredictable) discontin-
uous transitions between energy eigenstates (stationary quantum states) of
atomic systems (Born 1926).6 However, there does not seem to be any mean-
ingful difference between quantum jumps into new states or subspaces and
the “occurrence of values” for certain observables (cf. Sect. 2.2).
6 Thus also Bohr (1928) in a subsection entitled “Quantum postulate and causal-
ity” about “the quantum theory”: “. . . its essence may be expressed in the so-
called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential
discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to classical theories and
symbolized by Planck’s quantum of action” (my italics). The later revision of
these early interpretations of quantum theory (required by the important role of
entangled quantum states for much larger systems) seems to have gone unnoticed
by many physicists.
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In scattering theory, one usually probes only part of quantum mechanics
by restricting consideration to asymptotic states and their probabilities (dis-
regarding their superpositions). All quantum correlations between them then
appear statistical (“classical”). Occasionally even the unitary scattering am-
plitudes 〈mout|nin〉 = 〈m|S |n〉 are confused with the probability amplitudes
〈φm|ψn〉 which describe measurements to find a state |φm〉 in an initial |ψn〉.
In his general S-matrix theory, Heisenberg temporarily speculated about de-
riving the latter from the former. Since macroscopic systems never become
asymptotic because of their dynamical entanglment with the environment,
they can not be described by an S-matrix at all.
The Born/von Neumann dynamical dualism was evidently the major mo-
tivation for an ignorance interpretation of the wave function, which attempts
to explain the collapse not as a dynamical process in the system, but as
an increase of information about it (the reduction of an ensemble of pos-
sible states). However, even though the dynamics of ensembles in classical
description uses a formally similar dualism, an analogous interpretation in
quantum theory leads to the severe (and apparently fatal) difficulties indi-
cated above. They are often circumvented by the invention of “new rules of
logic and statistics”, which are not based on any ensemble interpretation or
incomplete information.
If the state of a classical system is incompletely known, and the cor-
responding point p,q in phase space therefore replaced by an ensemble (a
probability distribution) ρ(p, q), this ensemble can be “reduced” by a new
observation that leads to increased information. For this purpose, the system
must interact in a controllable manner with the “observer” who holds the
information (cf. Szilard 1929). His physical state of memory must thereby
change in dependence on the property-to-be-measured of the observed sys-
tem, leaving the latter unchanged in the ideal case (no “recoil”). Accord-
ing to deterministic dynamical laws, the ensemble entropy of the combined
system, which initially contains the entropy corresponding to the unknown
microscopic quantity, would remain constant if it were defined to include the
entropy characterizing the final ensemble of different outcomes. Since the ob-
server is assumed to “know” (to be aware of) his own state, this ensemble
is reduced correspondingly, and the ensemble entropy defined with respect to
his state of information is lowered.
This is depicted by the first step of Fig. 2.1, where ensembles of states
are represented by areas. In contrast to many descriptions of Maxwell’s de-
mon, the observer (regarded as a device) is here subsumed into the ensemble
description. Physical entropy, unlike ensemble entropy, is usually understood
as a local (additive) concept, which neglects long range correlations for being
“irrelevant”, and thus approximately defines an entropy density. Physical and
ensemble entropy are equal in the absence of correlations. The information
I, given in the figure, measures the reduction of entropy according to the
increased knowledge of the observer.
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Fig. 2.1. Entropy relative to the state of information in an ideal classical mea-
surement. Areas represent sets of microscopic states of the subsystems (while those
of uncorrelated combined systems would be represented by their direct products).
During the first step of the figure, the memory state of the observer changes de-
terministically from 0 to A or B, depending on the state a or b of the system to
be measured. The second step depicts a subsequent reset, required if the measure-
ment is to be repeated with the same device (Bennett 1973). A′ and B′ are effects
which must thereby arise in the thermal environment in order to preserve the to-
tal ensemble entropy in accordance with presumed microscopic determinism. The
“physical entropy” (defined to add for subsystems) measures the phase space of
all microscopic degrees of freedom, including the property to be measured, while
depending on given macroscopic variables. Because of its presumed additivity, this
physical entropy neglects all remaining statistical correlations (dashed lines, which
indicate sums of products of sets) for being “irrelevant” in the future – hence
Sphysical ≥ Sensemble. I is the amount of information held by the observer. The min-
imum initial entropy, S0, is k ln 2 in this simple case of two equally probable values
a and b.
This description does not necessarily require a conscious observer (al-
though it may ultimately rely upon him). It applies to any macroscopic mea-
surement device, since physical entropy is not only defined to be local, but
also relative to “given” macroscopic properties (as a function of them). The
dynamical part of the measurement transforms “physical” entropy (here the
ensemble entropy of the microscopic variables) deterministically into entropy
of lacking information about controllable macroscopic properties. Before the
observation is taken into account (that is, before the “or” is applied), both
parts of the ensemble after the first step add up to give the ensemble entropy.
When it is taken into account (as done by the numbers given in the figure),
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the ensemble entropy is reduced according to the information gained by the
observer.
Any registration of information by the observer must use up his memory
capacity (“blank paper”), which represents non-maximal entropy. If the same
measurement is to be repeated, for example in a cyclic process that could be
used to transform heat into mechanical energy (Szilard, l.c.), this capacity
would either be exhausted at some time, or an equivalent amount of entropy
must be absorbed by the environment (for example in the form of heat) in
order to reset the measurement or registration device (second step of Fig. 2.1).
The reason is that two different states cannot deterministically evolve into
the same final state (Bennett 1973).7 This argument is based on an arrow of
time of “causality”, which requires that all correlations possess local causes
in their past (no “conspiracy”). The irreversible formation of “irrelevant”
correlations then explains the increase of physical (local) entropy, while the
ensemble entropy is conserved.
The unsurmountable problems encountered in an ensemble interpretation
of the wave function (or of any other superposition, such as |a〉+ |b〉) are re-
flected by the fact that there is no ensemble entropy that would represent the
unknown property-to-be-measured (see the first step of Fig. 2.2 or 2.3 – cf.
also Zurek 1984). The “ensemble entropy” is now defined by the “correspond-
ing” expression Sensemble = −ktr{ρ ln ρ} (but see Sect. 2.4 for the meaning
of the density matrix ρ). If the entropy of observer plus environment is the
same as in the classical case of Fig. 2.1, the total initial ensemble entropy is
now lower; in the case of equal initial probabilities for a and b it is S0−k ln 2.
It would even vanish for pure states φ and χ of observer and environment,
respectively: (|a〉+ |b〉)|φ0〉|χ0〉. The Schro¨dinger evolution (depicted in Fig.
2.3) would then be described by three dynamical steps,
(|a〉+ |b〉) |φ0〉 |χ0〉 → (|a〉 |φA〉+ |b〉 |φB〉) |χ0〉
→ |a〉 |φA〉 |χA′′〉+ |b〉 |φB〉 |χB′′〉
→ (|a〉 |χA′A′′〉+ |b〉 |χB′B′′〉) |φ0〉 , (2.3)
with an “irrelevant” (inaccessible) final quantum correlation between system
and environment as a relic from the initial superposition. In this unitary evo-
lution, the two “branches” recombine to form a nonlocal superposition. It
“exists, but it is not there”. Its local unobservability characterizes an “ap-
parent collapse” (as will be discussed). For a genuine collapse (Fig. 2.2),
the final correlation would be statistical, and the ensemble entropy would
increase, too.
As mentioned in Sect. 2.2, the general interaction dynamics that is re-
quired to describe “ideal” measurements according to the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion (2.1) is derived from the special case where the measured system is
7 In his definitions, Bennett did not count the entropy of the microscopic ensemble
a/b as physical entropy, because this variable is here assumed to be controllable,
in contrast to the “thermal” (ergodic or uncontrollable) property A′/B′.
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Fig. 2.2. Quantum measurement of a superposition |a〉+ |b〉 by means of a collapse
process, here assumed to be triggered by the macroscopic pointer position. The
initial entropy is smaller by one bit than in Fig. 2.1 (and may in principle vanish),
since there is no initial ensemble a/b for the property to be measured. Dashed lines
before the collapse now represent quantum entanglement. (Compare the ensemble
entropies with those of Fig. 2.1!) Increase of physical entropy in the first step is
appropriate only if the arising entanglement is regarded as irrelevant. The collapse
itself is often divided into two steps: first increasing the ensemble entropy by re-
placing the superposition with an ensemble, and then lowering it by reducing the
ensemble (applying the “or” – for macroscopic pointers only). The increase of en-
semble entropy, observed in the final state of the Figure, is a consequence of this
first step of the collapse. It brings the entropy up to its classical initial value of
Fig. 2.1
prepared in an eigenstate |n〉 before measurement (von Neumann 1932),
|n〉|Φ0〉 → |n〉|Φn〉 . (2.4)
Here, |n〉 corresponds to |a〉 or |b〉 in the figures, the pointer positions |Φn〉
to the states |φA〉 and |φB〉. (During non-ideal measurements, the state |n〉
would change, too.) However, applied to an initial superposition,
∑
cn|n〉,
the interaction according to (2.1) leads to an entangled superposition,(∑
cn|n〉
)
|Φ0〉 →
∑
cn|n〉|Φn〉 . (2.5)
As explained in Sect. 2.1.1, the resulting superposition represents an individ-
ual physical state that is different from all components appearing in this sum.
While decoherence arguments teach us (see Chap. 3) that neglecting the envi-
ronment of (2.5) is absolutely unrealistic if |Φn〉 describes the pointer state of
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Fig. 2.3. Quantum measurement of a superposition by means of “branching”
caused by decoherence (see text). The increase of physical entropy during the second
step applies if the distinction between environmental degrees of freedom A′′/B′′,
responsible for decoherence, is “irrelevant” (uncontrollable). After the last step, all
entanglement has irreversibly become irrelevant in practice. Since the whole super-
position is here assumed to “exist” forever (and may have future consequences in
principle), the branching is meaningful only with respect to a local observer.
a macroscopic apparatus, this superposition remains nonetheless valid if Φ is
defined to include the “rest of the universe”, such as |Φn〉 = |φn〉|χn〉, with an
environmental state |χ〉. This powerful consequence of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion holds regardless of all complications, such as decoherence and other,
in practice irreversible, processes (which need not even be known). There-
fore, it does seem that the measurement problem can only be resolved if the
Schro¨dinger dynamics (2.1) is supplemented by a nonunitary collapse (2.2).
Specific proposals for such a process will be discussed in Chap. 8. Remark-
ably, however, there is no empirical evidence yet on where the Schro¨dinger
equation may have to be modified for this purpose (see Joos 1986, Pearle and
Squires 1994, or d’Espagnat 2001). On the contrary, the dynamical superpo-
sition principle has been confirmed with phantastic accuracy in spin systems
(Weinberg 1989, Bollinger et al. 1989).
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory insists that the mea-
surement outcome has to be described in fundamental classical terms rather
than as a quantum state. While according to Pauli (in a letter to Einstein:
Born 1969), the appearance of an electron position is “a creation outside of
the laws of Nature” (eine ausserhalb der Naturgesetze stehende Scho¨pfung),
Ulfbeck and Bohr (2001) now claim (similar to Ludwig 1990 in his attempt
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to derive “the” Copenhagen interpretation from fundamental principles) that
it is the click in the counter that appears “out of the blue”, and “without an
event that takes place in the source itself as a precurser to the click”. Together
with the occurrence of this, thus not dynamically analyzable, irreversible event
in the counter, the wave function is then claimed to “lose its meaning” (pre-
cisely where it would otherwise describe decoherence!). The Copenhagen in-
terpretation is often hailed as the greatest revolution in physics, since it rules
out the general applicability of the concept of objective physical reality. I
am instead inclined to regard it as a kind of “quantum voodoo”: irrational-
ism in place of dynamics. The theory of decoherence describes events in the
counter by means of a universal Schro¨dinger equation as a fast and for all
practical purposes irreversible dynamical creation of entanglement with the
environment (see also Shi 2000). In order to remain “politically correct”, some
authors have recently even re-defined complementarity in terms of entangle-
ment (cf. Bertet et al. 2001), although the latter has never been a crucial
element of the Copenhagen interpretation.
The “Heisenberg cut” between observer and observed has often been
claimed to be quite arbitrary. This cut represents the borderline at which the
probability interpretation for the occurrence of events is applied. However,
shifting it too far into the microscopic realm would miss the readily observed
quantum aspects of certain large systems (SQUIDs etc.), while placing it
beyond the detector would require the latter’s decoherence to be taken into
account anyhow. As pointed out by John Bell (1981), the cut has to be placed
“far enough” from the measured object in order to ensure that our limited
capabilities of investigation (such as those of keeping the measured system
isolated) prevent us from discovering any inconsistencies with the assumed
classical properties or a collapse.
As noticed quite early in the historical debate, the cut may even be placed
deep into the human observer, whose consciousness, which may be located in
the cerebral cortex, represents the final link in the observational chain. This
view can be found in early formulations by Heisenberg, it was favored by von
Neumann, later discussed by London and Bauer (1939), and again supported
by Wigner (1962), among others. It has even been interpreted as an objective
influence of consciousness on physical reality (e.g. Wigner l.c.), although it
may be consistent with the formalism only when used with respect to one
final observer, that is, in a strictly subjective (though partly objectivizable)
sense (Zeh 1971).
The “undivisible chain between observer and observed” is physically rep-
resented by a complex interacting medium, or a chain of intermediary systems
|χ(i)〉, in quantum mechanical terms symbolically written as
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∣∣ψsystemn 〉
∣∣∣χ(1)0
〉 ∣∣∣χ(2)0
〉
· · ·
∣∣∣χ(K)0
〉 ∣∣χobs0 〉
→ ∣∣ψsystemn 〉
∣∣∣χ(1)n
〉 ∣∣∣χ(2)0
〉
· · ·
∣∣∣χ(K)0
〉 ∣∣χobs0 〉
...
→
∣∣ψsystemn 〉
∣∣∣χ(1)n
〉 ∣∣∣χ(2)n
〉
· · ·
∣∣∣χ(K)n
〉 ∣∣χobsn 〉 , (2.6)
instead of the simplified form (2.4). This chain is thus assumed to act dy-
namically step by step (cf. Zeh 1973). While an initial superposition of the
observed system now leads to a superposition of such product states (similar
to (2.5)), we know empirically that a collapse must be “taken into account”
by the conscious observer before (or at least when) the information arrives
at him as the final link. If there are several chains connecting observer and
observed (for example via other observers, known as “Wigner’s friends”), the
correctly applied Schro¨dinger equation warrants that each individual compo-
nent (2.6) describes consistent (“objectivized”) measurement results. From
the subjective point of view of the final observer, all intermediary systems
(“Wigner’s friends” or “Schro¨dinger’s cats”, including their environments)
could well remain in a superposition of drastically different situations until
he observes (or communicates with) them!
Environment-induced decoherence means that an avalanche of other causal
chains unavoidably branch off from the intermediary links of the chain as soon
as they become macroscopic (see Chap. 3). This might even trigger a real col-
lapse process (to be described by hypothetical dynamical terms), since the
many-particle correlations arising from decoherence would render the total
system prone to such as yet unobserved, but nevertheless conceivable, non-
linear many-particle forces (Pearle 1976, Dio´si 1985, Ghirardi, Rimini, and
Weber 1986, Tessieri, Vitali, and Grigolini 1995; see also Chap. 8). Deco-
herence by a microscopic environment has been experimentally confirmed to
be reversible in what is now often called “quantum erasure” of a measure-
ment (see Herzog et al. 1995). In analogy to the concept of particle creation,
reversible decoherence may be regarded as “virtual decoherence”. “Real” de-
coherence, which gives rise to the familiar classical appearance of the macro-
scopic world, is instead characterized by its unavoidability and irreversibility
in practice.
In an important contribution, Tegmark (2000) was able to demonstrate
that neuronal and other processes in the brain also become quasi-classical
because of environmental decoherence. (Successful neuronal models are in-
deed classical.) This seems to imply that at least objective aspects of human
thinking and behavior can be described by conceptually classical (though not
necessarily deterministic) models of the brain. However, since no precise “lo-
calization of consciousness” within the brain has been found yet, the neural
network (just as the retina, say) may still be part of the “external world”
with respect to the unknown ultimate observer system (Zeh 1979). Because
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of Tegmarks arguments, this problem may not affect an objective theory of
observation any longer.
Even “real” decoherence in the sense of above must be distinguished from
a genuine collapse, which is defined as the disappearance of all but one com-
ponents from reality (thus representing an irreversible law).8 As pointed out
above, a collapse could well occur much later in the observational chain than
decoherence, and possibly remain less fine-grained. Nonetheless, it should
then be detectable in other situations if its dynamical rules are defined.
Environment-induced decoherence (the dynamically arising strong correla-
tions with the rest of the world) leads to the important consequence that,
in a world with no more than few-particle forces, robust factor states
∣∣χobsn 〉
are not affected by what goes on in the other branches that have formed
according to the Schro¨dinger equation.
In order to represent a subjective observer, a physical system must be in
a definite state with respect to properties of which he/she/it is aware. The
salvation of a psycho-physical parallelism of this kind was von Neumann’s
main argument for the introduction of his “first intervention” (2.2): the col-
lapse. As a consequence of the above-discussed dynamical independence of
the different individual components of type (2.6) in their superposition, one
may instead associate all arising factor wave functions
∣∣ψobsn 〉 (different ones
in each component) with separate subjective observers (that is, with differ-
ent states of consciousness). This approach, which avoids a collapse as a new
dynamical law, is essentially identical with Everett’s “relative state inter-
pretation” (so called, since the worlds observed by these observer states are
described by their corresponding relative factor states). Although also called
a “many worlds interpretation”, it describes one quantum universe. Because
of its (essential and non-trivial) reference to conscious observers, it may more
appropriately be called a “multi-consciousness” or “many minds interpreta-
tion” (Zeh 1970, 1971, 1979, 1981, 2000, Albert and Loewer 1988, Lockwood
1989, Squires 1990, Stapp 1993, Donald 1995, Page 1995).9
8 Proposed decoherence mechanisms involving event horizons (Hawking 1987, Ellis,
Mohanty and Nanopoulos 1989) would either require a fundamental violation of
unitarity, or merely represent a specific kind of environmental decoherence (en-
tanglement beyond the horizon). The most immediate consequence of quantum
entanglement is that quantum theory can be consistently applied only to the
whole universe.
9 As Bell (1981) pointed out, Bohm’s theory would instead require consciousness
to be psycho-physically coupled to certain classical variables (which this theory
postulates to exist). These variables are probabilistically related to the wave func-
tion by means of a conserved statistical initial condition. Thus one may argue
that the “many minds interpretation” merely eliminates Bohm’s unobservable
and therefore meaningless intermediary classical variables and their trajectories
from this psycho-physical connection. This is possible because of the dynami-
cal autonomy of a wave function that evolves in time according to a universal
Schro¨dinger equation, and independently of Bohm’s classical variables. These
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Because of their dynamical independence, all these different observers (or
rather, different “versions” of the same observer) cannot find out by means of
experiments whether or not the other components have survived. This conse-
quence of the Schro¨dinger equation thus leads to the impression (for separate
observers) that all “other” components have “hurried out of existence” as
soon as decoherence has become irreversible for all practical purposes. Then
it remains a pure matter of taste whether Occam’s razor is applied to the
wave function (by adding appropriate but not directly detectable collapse-
producing nonlinear terms to its dynamical law), or to the dynamical law (by
instead adding myriads of unobservable Everett components to our concep-
tion of “reality”). Traditionally (and mostly successfully), consistency of the
law has been ranked higher than simplicity of the facts.
Fortunately, the dynamics of decoherence can be discussed without giv-
ing an answer to this question. A collapse (real or apparent) has to be taken
into account regardless of its interpretation in order to describe the dynam-
ics of that wave function which represents our observed quasi-classical world
(the time-dependent component which contains “our” observer states
∣∣χobsn 〉).
Only specific dynamical collapse models could be confirmed or ruled out by
experiments, while Everett’s relative states, on the other hand, depend in
principle on the definition of the observer system.10 (No other “systems”
have to be specified in principle. Their density matrices, which describe de-
coherence and quasi-classical concepts, are merely convenient.)
In contrast to Bohm’s theory or stochastic collapse models, nothing has
been said yet (or postulated) about probabilities of measurement outcomes.
For this purpose, the Everett branches have to be given statistical weights in a
way that appears ad hoc again. However, these probabilities are meaningful to
an observer only as frequencies in series of equivalent measurements. These
measurements must be performed in his branch (and would in general be
performed and lead to different results in other branches). Graham (1970)
was able to show that the norm of the superposition of all those Everett
branches (arising from such series of measurements) which contain frequencies
of results that substantially differ from Born’s probabilities vanishes in the
limit of infinite series. Although the definition of the norm, which is used in
this argument, is exactly equivalent to Born’s probabilties, it can be selected
variables thus cannot, by themselves, carry memories of their “surrealistic” his-
tory. Memory is solely in the quasi-classical wave packet that effectively guides
them, while the other myriads of “empty” Everett world components (criticized
for being “extravagant” by Bell) exist as well in Bohm’s theory. Barbour (1994,
1999), in his theory of timelessness, effectively proposed a static version of Bohm‘s
theory, which eliminates the latter’s formal classical trajectories even though it
preserves a concept of memories without a history (“time capsules” – see also
Chapt. 6 of Zeh 2001).
10 Another aspect of this observer-relatedness of the observed world is the concept
of a presence, which is not part of physical time. It reflects the empirical fact that
the subjective observer is local in space and time.
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against other definitions of a norm by its unique property of being conserved
under the Schro¨dinger dynamics.
To give an example: an isolated decaying quantum system may be de-
scribed as a superposition of its metastable initial state and the outgoing
channel wave function(s) for all its decay products. On a large but finite
region of space and time the total wave function may then approximately
decrease exponentially and coherently in accordance with the Schro¨dinger
equation (with very small late-time deviations from exponential behavior
caused by the dispersion of the outgoing waves). For a system that decays
by emitting photons into a reflecting cavity, a superposition of different de-
cay times has in fact been confirmed in the form of coherent “state vector
revival” (Rempe, Walther and Klein 1987). An even more complex exper-
iment exhibiting coherent state vector revival was performed by means of
spin waves (Rhim, Pines and Waugh 1971). In general, however, the decay
fragments would soon be “monitored” by surrounding matter. The resulting
state of the environment must then depend (contain “information”) on the
decay time, and the superposition will decohere into dynamically independent
components corresponding to different (approximately defined) decay times.
From the point of view of a local observer, the system may be assumed to
have decayed at a certain time (within the usually very narrow limits set by
the decoherence time scale – see Sect. 3.3.2), even though he need not have
observed the decay. This situation does not allow coherent state vector re-
vival any more. Instead, it leads to an exponential distribution of decay times
in the arising apparent ensemble, valid shortly after the decaying state has
been produced (see Joos 1984).
However, as long as the information has not yet reached the observer,(∑
n
cn
∣∣ψsystemn 〉
∣∣∣χ(1)n
〉 ∣∣∣χ(2)n
〉
· · ·
∣∣∣χ(K)n
〉) ∣∣χobs0 〉 , (2.7)
he may as well assume (from his subjective point of view) that the nonlo-
cal superposition still exists. According to the formalism, Schro¨dinger’s cat
(represented by
∣∣χ(2)〉, say) would then “become” dead or alive only when
he becomes aware of it. On the other hand, the property described by the
state |ψsystemn 〉 (just as the cat’s status of being dead or alive,
∣∣∣χ(2)n
〉
) can
also be assumed to have become “real” as soon as decoherence has become
irreversible in practice. Therefore, decoherence must also corrupt any control-
lable entanglement that would give rise to a violation of Bell’s inequalities (as
it does – see Venugopalan, Kumar and Gosh 1995). If, instead of taking notice
of the result, the observer would decide to perform another measurement of
the “system” (by using a new observational chain), he could not observe any
interference between different n’s, since, as a local system, he cannot perform
the required global measurements. All predictions which this observer can
check are consistent with the assumption that the system was in one of the
states |ψsystemn 〉 (with probability |cn|2) before the second measurement (see
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also Sect. 2.4). This justifies the interpretation that the cat is determined to
die or not yet to die as soon as irreversible decoherence has occurred some-
where in the chain (which will in general be the case before the poison is
applied).
2.4 Density Matrix, Coarse Graining, and “Events”
The theory of decoherence uses some (more or less technical) auxiliary con-
cepts. Their physical meaning will be recalled and discussed in this section,
as it is essential for a correct interpretation of what is actually achieved with
this theory.
In classical statistical mechanics, incomplete knowledge about the real
physical state of a system is described by “ensembles” of states, that is, by
probability distributions ρ(p, q) on phase space (in Fig. 2.1 symbolically in-
dicated by areas of uniform probability). Such ensembles are often called
“thermodynamic” or “macroscopic states”. Mean values of state functions
a(p, q) (that is, physical quantities that are determined by the microscopic
state p,q), defined with respect to this ensemble, are then given by the expres-
sion
∫
dp dq ρ(p, q)a(p, q). The ensemble ρ(p, q) itself could be recovered from
the mean values of a complete set of state functions (such as all δ-functions),
while a (smaller) set, that may be realized in practice, determines only a
“coarse-grained” probability distribution.
If all states which form such an ensemble are assumed to obey the same
Hamiltonian equations, their probability distribution ρ evolves according to
the Liouville equation,
∂ρ
∂t
= {H , ρ} , (2.8)
with Hamiltonian H and Poisson bracket {, }. However, this assumption
would be highly unrealistic for a many-particle system. Even if the funda-
mental dynamics is assumed to be given, the effective Hamiltonian for the
considered system depends very sensitively on the state of the “environment”,
which cannot be assumed to be known better than that of the system itself.
Borel (1914) showed long ago that even the gravitational effect resulting from
shifting a small rock at the distance of Sirius by a few centimetres would
completely change the microscopic state of a gas in a vessel here on earth
within seconds after the retarded field has arrived (see also Chap. 3). In a
similar connection, Ernst Mach spoke of the “profound interconnectedness
of things”. This surprising result is facilitated by the enormous amplification
of the tiny differences in the molecular trajectories, caused by the slightly
different forces, during subsequent collisions with other molecules (each time
by a factor of the order of the ratio of the mean free path over the molecular
radius). Similarly, microscopic differences in the state of the gas will imme-
diately disturb its environment, thus leading in turn to slightly different ef-
fective Hamiltonians for the gas, with in general grossly different (“chaotic”)
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effects on the microscopic states of the original ensemble. This will induce
strong statistical correlations of the gas with its environment, whose neglect
would lead to an increase of ensemble entropy.
This effective local dynamical indeterminism can be taken into account
(when calculating forward in time) by means of stochastic forces (using a
Langevin equation) for the individual state, or by means of a corresponding
master equation for an ensemble of states, ρ(p, q). The increase of the local
ensemble entropy is thus attributed to an uncertain effective Hamiltonian.
In this way, statistical correlations with the environment are regarded as
dynamically irrelevant for the future evolution. An example is Boltzmann’s
collision equation (where the arising irrelevant correlations are intrinsic to
the gas, however). The justification of this time-asymmetric procedure forms
a basic problem of physics and cosmology (Zeh 2001).
When appying the conventional quantization rules to the Liouville equa-
tion (2.8) in a formal way, one obtains the von Neumann equation (or quantum
Liouville equation),
ih¯
∂ρ
∂t
= [H , ρ] , (2.9)
for the dynamics of “statistical operators” or “density operators” ρ. Simi-
larly, expectation values 〈A〉 = tr(Aρ)/tr(ρ) of observables A formally re-
place mean values a¯ =
∫
dp dq a(p, q)ρ(p, q) of the state functions a(p, q).
Expectation values of a restricted set of observables would again represent
a generalized coarse graining for the density operators. The von Neumann
equation (2.9) is unrealistic for similar reasons as is the Liouville equation,
although quantitative differences may arise from the different energy spec-
tra – mainly at low energies. Discrete spectra have relevant consequences for
macroscopic systems in practice only in exceptional cases, while they often
prevent mathematically rigorous proofs of ergodic or chaos theorems which
are valid in excellent approximation. However, whenever quantum correla-
tions do form in analogy to classical correlations (as is the rule), they lead to
far more profound consequences than their classical counterparts.
In order to explain these differences, the concept of a density matrix has
to be derived from that of a (pure) quantum state instead of being postulated
by means of quantization rules. According to Sect. 2.2, the probability for a
state |n〉 to be “found” in a state |α〉 in a corresponding measurement is
given by |〈n | α〉|2. Its mean probability in an ensemble of states {|α〉} with
probabilities pα representing incomplete information about the initial state α
is, therefore, pn =
∑
pα|〈n | α〉|2 = tr{ρPn}, where ρ =
∑ |α〉pα〈α| and Pn =
|n〉〈n|. This result remains true for general observables A =∑ anPn in place
of Pn. The ensemble of wave functions |α〉, which thus defines a density matrix
as representing a state of information, need not consist of mutually orthogonal
states, although the density matrix can always be diagonalized in terms of its
eigenbasis. Its representation by a general ensemble of states is therefore far
from unique – in contrast to a classical probability distribution. Nonetheless,
the density matrix can still be shown to obey a von Neumann equation if
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all states contained in the ensemble are assumed to evolve according to the
same unique Hamiltonian.
However, the fundamental nonlocality of quantum states means that the
state of a local system does not exist in general: it cannot be merely unknown.
Accordingly, there is no effective local Hamiltonian that would allow (2.9) to
apply in principle (see Ku¨bler and Zeh 1973). In particular, a time-dependent
Hamiltonian would in general require a (quasi-)classical environment. This
specific quantum aspect is easily overlooked when the density matrix is intro-
duced axiomatically by “quantizing” a classical probability distribution on
phase space.
Quantum nonlocality means that the generic state of a composite system
(“system” and environment, say),
|Ψ〉 =
∑
m,n
cmn
∣∣φsystemm 〉 ∣∣φenvironmentn 〉 , (2.10)
does not factorize. The expectation values of all local observables,
A = Asystem ⊗ 1lenvironment , (2.11)
have then to be calculated by “tracing out” the environment,
〈Ψ |A |Ψ〉 ≡ tr {A |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|} = tracesystem
{
Asystemρsystem
}
. (2.12)
Here, the density matrix ρsystem, which in general has nonzero entropy even
for a pure (completely defined) global state |Ψ〉, is given by
ρsystem ≡
∑
m,m′
∣∣φsystemm 〉 ρsystemmm′ 〈φsystemm′ ∣∣
:= traceenv {|Ψ〉 〈Ψ |} ≡
∑
m,m′
∣∣φsystemm 〉∑
n
cmnc
∗
m′n
〈
φsystemm′
∣∣ . (2.13)
It represents the specific coarse-graining with respect to all subsystem ob-
servables only. This “reduced density matrix” can be formally represented by
various ensembles of local states (including its eigenrepresentation or diagonal
form), although it does here characterize one pure but entangled global state.
A density matrix thus based on entanglement has been called an “improper
mixture” by d’Espagnat (1966). It can evidently not explain ensembles of def-
inite measurement outcomes. If proper and improper mixtures were identified
for operationalistic reasons (that are based on the measurement postulate),
then decoherence would indeed completely “solve” the measurement problem.
Regardless of its origin and interpretation, the density matrix can be
replaced by its partial Fourier transform, known as the Wigner function (see
also Sect. 3.2.3):
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W (p, q) : =
1
pi
∫
e2ipxρ(q + x, q − x) dx
≡ 1
2pi
∫ ∫
δ
(
q − z + z
′
2
)
eip(z−z
′)ρ(z, z′) dzdz′
= : trace{Σp,qρ} . (2.14)
The second line is here written in analogy to the Bloch vector, pii = trace{σiρ},
since
Σp,q(z, z
′) :=
1
2pi
eip(z−z
′) δ
(
q − z + z
′
2
)
(2.15)
is a generalization of the Pauli matrices (with index p, q instead of i = 1, 2, 3
– see also Sect. 4.4 of Zeh 2001). Although the Wigner function is formally
analogous to a phase space distribution, it does, according to its derivation,
not represent an ensemble of classical states (phase space points). This is re-
flected by its potentially negative values, while even a Gaussian wave packet,
which does lead to a non-negative Wigner function, is nonetheless one (pure)
quantum state.
The degree of entanglement represented by an improper mixture (2.13)
is conveniently measured by the latter’s formal entropy, such as the linear
entropy Slin = trace(ρ−ρ2). In a “bipartite system”, themutual entanglement
of its two parts may often be controlled and used for specific applications
(EPR-Bell type experiments, quantum cryptography, quantum teleportation,
etc.). This is possible as far as the entanglement is not obscured by a mixed
state of the total system. Therefore, other measures have been proposed to
characterize the operationally available entanglement in mixtures (Peres 1996,
Vedral et al. 1997). However, these measures do not represent the true and
complete entanglement, since a mixed state, which reduces this measure, is
either based on entanglement itself (on that of the whole bipartite system
with its environment), or the consequence of averaging over an ensemble of
unknown (but nonetheless entangled) states.
The eigenbasis of the reduced density matrix can be used, by othogonal-
izing the correlated “relative states” of the environment, to write the total
state as a single sum,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
√
pk
∣∣∣φˆsystemk
〉 ∣∣∣φˆenvironmentk
〉
. (2.16)
While Erhard Schmidt (1907) first introduced this representation as a math-
ematical theorem, Schro¨dinger (1935) used it for discussing entanglement
as representing what he called “probability relations between separated sys-
tems”. It was later shown to be useful for describing quantum nonlocality
and decoherence by means of a universal wave function (Zeh 1971, 1973).
The two orthogonal systems φˆk of the Schmidt form (2.16) are determined
(up to degeneracy of the pk’s) by the total state |Ψ〉 itself. A time dependence
2 Basic Concepts and their Interpretation 31
of |Ψ〉 must therefore affect both the Schmidt states and their (formal) prob-
abilities pk (see Ku¨bler and Zeh 1973, Pearle 1979, Albrecht 1993), hence
also the subsystem entropy, such as the linear entropy
∑
pk(1 − pk). The
induced subsystem dynamics is thus not “autonomous”. Similar to the mo-
tion of a shadow that merely reflects the regular motion of a physical object,
the reduced information content of the subsystem density matrix by itself is
insufficient to determine its own change. Likewise, Boltzmann had to intro-
duce his Stoßzahlansatz, based on statistical assumptions, when neglecting
statistical correlations between particles (instead of quantum entanglement).
The exact dynamics of any local “system” would in general require the whole
Universe to be taken into account.
Effective “open systems quantum dynamics” has indeed been postulated
in analogy to the Boltzmann equation by means of semigroups or master
equations for calculating forward in time. An equivalent formalism was intro-
duced by Feynman and Vernon (1963) in terms of path integrals. As explained
above, this description can neither be exact, nor would it justify the replace-
ment of improper mixtures by proper ones unless explicitly postulated as a
fundamental correction to the Schro¨dinger equation. The formal theory of
master equations will be discussed in Chap. 7 (see also Zeh 2001). Its foun-
dation for local systems in terms of a global unitary Schro¨dinger equation
requires very specific (statistically improbable) cosmic initial conditions.
According to a universal Schro¨dinger equation, quantum correlations with
the environment are permanently created with great efficiency for all macro-
scopic systems, thus leading to decoherence, defined as the irreversible dislo-
calization of phase relations (see Chap. 3 for many examples). The apparent
(or “improper”) ensembles, obtained for subsystems in this way, often led to
claims that decoherence be able (or meant) to solve the measurement prob-
lem.11 The apparent nature of these ensembles has then in turn been used to
declare the program of decoherence a failure. As explained in Sect. 2.3, both
claims miss the point. However, decoherence represents a crucial dynamical
step in the measurement process. The rest may remain a pure epistemologi-
cal problem (requiring only a reformulation of the psycho-physical parallelism
in quantum mechanical terms). If the Schro¨dinger equation is exact, the ob-
served quantum indeterminism can only reflect that of the observer’s identity
– not one to be found in objective dynamics.
The process of decoherence leads to a novel, dynamically consistent con-
cept of a generalized course graining. If phase relations between certain sub-
11 In the Schmidt basis, interference terms are exactly absent by definition. Hepp
(1972) used the formal limit N →∞ to obtain this result in a given basis (while
this may require infinite time). However, the global state always remains one
pure superposition. The Schmidt representation has therefore been used instead
to specify the Everett branching, that is, to define the ultimate “pointer basis”
|χobserver
n
〉 for each observer (cf. Zeh 1973, 1979, Albrecht 1992, 1993, Barvinsky
and Kamenshchik 1995). It is also used in the “modal interpretation” of quantum
mechanics (cf. Dieks 1995).
32 H.D. Zeh (www.zeh-hd.de)
spaces of a system permanently disappear by decoherence, their reduced den-
sity matrices may be approximated in the form
ρ =
∑
m,n
PmρPn ≈
∑
n
PnρPn , (2.17)
where Pn projects on to the n-th decohered subspace, while
∑
Pn = 1l. The
dynamics of the formal probabilities pn(t) := tr{Pnρ(t)} may then be written
as a master equation, similar to the Pauli equation,
p˙n =
∑
m
Anm(pm − pn) , (2.18)
as was shown by Joos (1984). Since (2.18) describes stochastic subsystem
dynamics (in the direction of time that is characterized by the process of
decoherence), it defines probabilities for coarse-grained “histories” n(t), cor-
responding to time-ordered sequences of projections Pn1(t1) . . . Pnk(tk). Prob-
abilities for such histories in discrete time steps can be written as
p(n1, . . . , nk) = tr{Pnk(tk) . . .Pn1(t1)ρ(t0)} (2.19)
(using of the property P 2 = P of projection operators). States nk dynamically
arising according to a master equation may contain “consistent memories”
(or “time capsules” in Barbour’s words), while the corresponding apparent
histories appear “quasi-classical” (robust under decoherence). Such histories
would individually obey a quantum Langevin equation (an indeterministic
generalization of the Schro¨dinger equation). Models (often assumed to hold
exactly instead of the Schro¨dinger equation) have been proposed by Dio´si
(1986), Belavkin (1988), Gisin and Percival (1992), and others – see also
Dio´si and Kiefer (2001).
In the theory of “consistent histories” (Griffiths 1984, Omne`s 1992, 1995),
formal projections Pn are called “events” regardless of any dynamics. These
events are thus not dynamically described within the theory – in accord with
the Copenhagen interpretation, where events are assumed to occur “out of the
blue” or “outside the laws of nature”. However, only those histories n1, . . . nk
are then admitted by postulate (that is, assumed to “occur”) which possess
“consistent” probabilities – in the dynamical sense of being compatible with
a stochastic evolution. This condition requires (a weak form of) decoherence,
which is not generally based on entanglement (cf. Omne`s 1999). This dynam-
ical dilemma is then resolved by Griffiths and Omne`s by introducing a “new
logic”. It culminates in Omne`s’ (1995) surprising remark that “the formalism
of logic is not time-reversal invariant, as can be seen in the time ordering of
the (projection) operators”. However, a property a at time t1 that is said
to “imply” a property b at time t2 > t1 would describe a causal (that is,
dynamical) rather than a logical relationship. This conceptual confusion of
cause and reason seems to have a long tradition in philosophy, while even in
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mathematics the truth of logical theorems is often inappropriately defined by
means of logical operations that have to be performed in time (thus mimicking
a causal relation).
In the theory of decoherence, apparent events in the detector are described
dynamically by the universal Schro¨dinger equation, using certain initial con-
ditions for the environment, as a very fast but smooth formation of entan-
glement. Similarly, “particles” appear in the form of narrow wave packets in
space as a consequence of decoherence in the detector. This identification of
observable events with a decoherence process holds regardless of any conceiv-
able subsequent genuine collapse. Therefore, decoherence is not only respon-
sible for the classical aspects of quantum theory, but also for its “quantum”
aspects (see Sect. 3.3.2.3). All fundamental physical concepts are continuous
and based on “smooth” Schro¨dinger dynamics.
This description of quantum events as a unitary process also avoids any
“superluminal effects” that have been shown (with mathematical rigour –
see Hegerfeldt 1994) to arise (not very surprisingly) from explicitly or tac-
itly assumed instantaneous quantum jumps between exact energy or particle
number eigenstates.12 The latter require infinite exponential tails that can
never form completely in a relativistic world. Supporters of explicit collapse
mechanisms are quite aware of this problem, and try to avoid it (cf. Dio´si and
Luka´cz 1994 and Chap. 8). In the nonlocal quantum formalism, dynamical
locality is achieved by using Hamiltonian operators that are spatial integrals
over a Hamiltonian density. This form prevents superluminal signalling and
the like.
2.5 Conclusion
Let me recall the interpretation of quantum theory that has now emerged in
accordance with the concept of decoherence:
(1) General quantum superpositions (such as a wave function) represent in-
dividual physical states (Sect. 2.1.1).
(2) According to a universal Schro¨dinger equation, most superpositions are
almost immediately, and in practice irreversibly, dislocalized by interaction
12 Such superluminal “phenomena” are reminiscent of the story of Der Hase und
der Igel (the race between The Hedgehog and the Rabbit), narrated by the Grimm
brothers. Here, the hedgehog, as a competitor in the race, does not run at all,
while his wife is waiting at the end of the furrow, shouting in low German “Ick bin
all hier!” (“I’m already here!”). Similar arguments hold for “quantum teleporta-
tion” (cf. also Vaidman 1998). Experiments clearly support the view that reality
is described by a smoothly evolving wave function, nonlocal but dynamically com-
patible with relativity, rather than in terms of probabilistic “events” (cf. Fearn,
Cock, and Milonni 1995). It is the local observer whose identity “splits” indeter-
ministically according to the Schro¨dinger equation. Superluminal teleportation
would be required to describe the corresponding experiments if (local) physical
properties entered existence “out of the blue” in fundamental quantum events.
34 H.D. Zeh (www.zeh-hd.de)
with their environment. Although the resulting nonlocal superpositions still
exist, we do not know, in general, what they mean (or how they could be
observed). However, if dynamics is local (described by a Hamiltonian density
in space, H =
∫
h(r)d3r), approximately factorizing components may be
dynamically autonomous after this decoherence has occurred, and nonlocal
superpositions cannot return into local ones if statistical arguments apply to
the future (Zeh 2001).
(3) Any observer (assumed to be local for empirical and dynamical reasons)
who attempts to observe a subsystem of the nonlocal superposition must
become part of this entanglement. Those of his component states which are
then related only by nonlocal phase relations describe different observations.
So we may axiomatically identify these individual component states of the
observer with states of consciousness (novel psycho-physical parallelism).
(4) Because of this dynamical autonomy of decohered world components
(“branches”), there is no reason to deny the existence of “the other” compo-
nents which result from the Schro¨dinger equation (“many minds interpreta-
tion” – Sect. 2.3).
(5) Probabilities are meaningful only as frequencies in series of repeated mea-
surements. In order to derive the observed Born probabilities in terms of
frequencies, we have to postulate merely that we are living in an “Everett
branch” with not extremely small norm.
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